Je rejette l’idée selon laquelle les désirs seraient raisonnables parce que cohérents. Je suggère que nos désirs et nos dispositions émotionnelles sont raisonnables à deux conditions : premièrement, qu’ils contribuent à une vie subjectivement heureuse ; deuxièmement, qu’ils soient moralement justifiés.
We often judge that emotions are more or less reasonable given their object and context. I claim that the legitimacy of these judgments rests on the fact that the desires or emotional dispositions that explain these emotional responses are themselves reasonable. It is unreasonable to be sad not to satisfy a desire that is unreasonable. But how can desires themselves be unreasonable? I reject the idea to the effect that desires are reasonable insofar as they are coherent. I suggest instead that our desires and emotional dispositions are reasonable insofar as they satisfy two conditions: first, they contribute to a happy life, which I conceive in subjectivist terms; second, they are morally justified.